David Hume
A LETTER FROM A GENTLEMAN TO HIS FRIEND IN EDINBURGH CONTAINING
Some OBSERVATIONS ON A Specimen of the Principles concerning RELIGION and MORALITY, said to be maintain'd in a Book lately publish'd, intituled, A Treatise of Human Nature, &c.
(1745)
* * * *
{3}
SIR,
I Have read over the Specimen of the Principles concerning Religion
and Morality, said to be maintain'd in a Book lately published,
intituled, A Treatise of Human Nature; being an Attempt to
introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects.
I have also read over what is called the Sum of the Charge. Which
Papers, as you inform me, have been industriously spread about, and
were put into your hands some few Days ago.
I was perswaded that the Clamour of Scepticism, Atheism, &c.
had been so often employ'd by the worst of Men against the best,
that it had now lost all its Influence; and should never have
thought of making any Remarks on these maim'd Excerpts, if you had
not laid your Commands on me, as a piece of common Justice to the
Author, and for undeceiving some well-meaning People, on whom it
seems the enormous Charge has made Impression. {4}
I shall insert the Accusation at full Length, and then go
regularly through what is called the Sum of the Charge; because it
is intended, I suppose, to contain the Substance of the whole. I
shall also take notice of the Specimen as I go along.
Specimen of the Principles concerning Religion and Morality,
&c.
THE Author puts on his Title-page (Vol. I printed for J. Noon,
1739) a Passage of Tacitus to this Purpose; "Rare Happiness of our
Times, that you may think as you will, and speak as you think."
He expresses his Deference to the Publick in these Words
(Advertisement, p. 2.) The Approbation of the Publick I consider
as the greatest Reward of my Labours; but am determined to regard
its Judgment, whatever it be, as my best Instruction."
He gives us the summary View of his Philosophy from p. 458.
to 470. "I am confounded with that forlorn Solitude, in which I am
placed in my Philosophy. {5} -- I have exposed myself to the
Enmity of all Metaphysicians, Logicians, Mathematicians, and
even Theologians. -- I have declared my Disapprobations of
their Systems. -- When I turn my Eye inward, I find nothing but
Doubt and Ignorance. All the World conspires to oppose and
contradict me; tho' such is my Weakness, that I feel all my
Opinions loosen and fall of themselves, when unsupported by the
Approbation of others. -- Can I be sure, that, in leaving all
established Opinions, I am following Truth? and by what
Criterion shall I distinguish her, even if Fortune should at
last guide me on her Footsteps? After the most accurate and
exact of my Reasonings, I can give no Reason why I should
assent to it; and feel nothing but a strong Propensity to
consider Objects strongly in that View under which they appear
to me. -- The Memory, Senses, and Understanding, are all of
them founded on the Imagination. -- No Wonder a Principle so
inconstant and fallacious should lead us into Errors, when
implicitely followed (as it must be) in all its Variations. -I have already shown, that the Understanding, when it acts
alone, and according to its most general Principles, entirely
subverts itself, and leaves {6} not the lowest Degree of
Evidence in any Proposition either in Philosophy or common
Life. -- We have no Choice left, but betwixt a false Reason
and none at all. -- Where am I, or what? From what Causes do
I derive my Existence, and to what Condition shall I return?
Whose Favour shall I court, and whose Anger must I dread? What
Beings surround me? On whom have I any Influence, or who have
any Influence on me? I am confounded with all these Questions,
and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable Condition
imaginable, invironed with the deepest Darkness, and utterly
deprived of the Use of every Member and Faculty. -- If I must
be a Fool, as all those who reason or believe any Thing
certainly are, my Follies shall at least be natural and
agreeable. -- In all the Incidents of Life, we ought still to
preserve our Scepticism: If we believe that Fire warms, or
Water refreshes, 'tis only because it costs us too much
Pains to think otherwise; nay, if we are Philosophers, it
ought only to be upon sceptical Principles. -- I cannot
forbear having a Curiosity to be acquainted with the Principles
of moral Good and Evil, &c. I am concerned for he Condition of
the learned World, which lies under such a deplorable {7}
Ignorance in all these Particulars. I feel an Ambition arise in
me of contributing to the Instruction of Mankind, and of
acquiring a Name by my Inventions and Discoveries. -- Should
I endeavour to banish these Sentiments, I feel I should be a
Loser in point of Pleasure; and this is the Origin of my
Philosophy."
Agreeable to this summary View, he tells us, p. 123.
"Let us fix our Attention out of ourselves as much as
possible. -- We really never advance a Step beyond ourselves;
nor can conceive any Kind of Existence, but these Perceptions
which have appeared in that narrow Compass: This is the
Universe of the Imagination, nor have we any Idea but what is
there produced."
Accordingly,
An Opinion or Belief may be most accurately defined, A lively
Idea related or associated with a present Impression; and is
more properly an Act of the sensitive than of the cognitive
Part of our Natures."
And,
"Belief in general consists in nothing but the Vivacity of an
Idea. Again, the Idea of Existence is the very same with the
Idea of what we conceive to be existent. -- Any Idea we please
to form is the Idea of a Being; and the Idea of a Being is any
Idea we please to form. And as to the {8} Notion of an external
Existence, when taken for something specifically different from
our Perceptions, we have shown its absurdity: And what we call
a Mind is nothing but a Heap or Collection of different
Perceptions united together by certain Relations, and supposed,
tho' falsly, to be endowed with a perfect Simplicity."
And,
"The only Existence, of which we are certain, are Perceptions.
When I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I
always stumble on some particular Perception or other. -- I
never can catch myself at any Time without a Perception, and
never can observe any Thing but the Perception. -- If any one
think he has a different Notion of himself, I must confess I
can reason no longer with him. -- I may venture to affirm of
the rest of Mankind, that they are nothing but a Bundle of
Perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable
Rapidity, and are in a perpetual Flux and Movement." And lest the Reader should forget to apply all this to the Supreme
Mind, and the Existence of the First Cause, he has a long
Disquisition concerning Causes and Effects, the Sum of which
amounts to this, That all our Reasoning concerning Causes and
Effects are derived from nothing but Custom: That {9}
"if any pretend to define a Cause by saying it is something
productive of another, 'tis evident he would say nothing; for
what does he mean by Production? That we may define a Cause to
be an Object precedent and contiguous to another, and where
all the Objects resembling the former are placed in like
Relations of Precedency and Contiguity to these Objects that
resemble the latter; or, a Cause is an Object precedent and
contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the Idea of
the one determines the Mind to form the Idea of the other, and
the Impression of the one to form a more lively Idea of the
other."
From these clear and plain Definitions he infers,
That all Causes are of the same Kind; and there is no
Foundation for the Distinction betwixt efficient Causes, and
Causes sine qua non; or betwixt efficient Causes, and
formal and material, and exemplary, and final Causes: And that
there is but one Kind of Necessity, and the common Distinction
betwixt Moral and Physical is without any Foundation in Nature:
And that the Distinction we often make betwixt Power, and the
Exercise of it, is equally without Foundation: And that the
Necessity of a Cause to every Beginning of Existence, is not
founded on any Arguments demonstrative {10} or intuitive: And
in fine, That any Thing may produce any Thing; Creation,
Annihilation, Motion, Reason, Volition; all these may arise
from one another, or from any other Object we can imagine."
The curious Nostrum he often repeats, p. 430, 434. Again he
tells us,
"That when we talk of any Being, whether of a Superior or
Inferior Nature, as endowed with a ...
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