David Hume
OF THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE ARTS AND SCIENCES
(1742)
**********
About the print version:
Editor's note: "Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences"
appeared in 1742 in Volume two of Hume's Essays, Moral and
Political. The text file here is based on the 1875 Green and Grose
edition. Spelling and punctuation have been modernized.
************
* * * *
OF THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE ARTS AND SCIENCES
Nothing requires greater nicety, in our enquiries concerning
human affairs, than to distinguish exactly what is owing to
chance, and what proceeds from causes; nor is there any
subject, in which an author is more liable to deceive himself by
false subtilties and refinements. To say, that any event is
derived from chance, cuts short all farther enquiry concerning
it, and leaves the writer in the same state of ignorance with the
rest of mankind. But when the event is supposed to proceed from
certain and stable causes, he may then display his ingenuity, in
assigning these causes; and as a man of any subtilty can never be
at a loss in this particular, he has thereby an opportunity of
swelling his volumes, and discovering his profound knowledge, in
observing what escapes the vulgar and ignorant.
The distinguishing between chance and causes must depend
upon every particular man's sagacity, in considering every
particular incident. But, if I were to assign any general rule to
help us in applying this distinction, it would be the following,
What depends upon a few persons is, in a great measure, to be
ascribed to chance, or secret and unknown causes: What arises
from a great number, may often be accounted for by determinate
and known causes.
Two natural reasons may. be assigned for this rule. First,
If you suppose a dye to have any biass, however small, to a
particular side, this biass, though, perhaps, it may not appear
in a few throws, will certainly prevail in a great number, and
will cast the balance entirely to that side. In like manner, when
any causes beget a particular inclination or passion, at a
certain time, and among a certain people; though many individuals
may escape the contagion, and be ruled by passions peculiar to
themselves; yet the multitude will certainly be seized by the
common affection, and be governed by it in all their actions.
Secondly, Those principles of causes, which are fitted to
operate on a multitude, are always of a grosser and more stubborn
nature, less subject to accidents, and less influenced by whim
and private fancy, than those which operate on a few only. The
latter are commonly so delicate and refined, that the smallest
incident in the health, education, or fortune of a particular
person, is sufficient to divert their course, and retard their
operation; nor is it possible to reduce them to any general
maxims or observations. Their influence at one time will never
assure us concerning their influence at another; even though all
the general circumstances should be the same in both cases.
To judge by this rule, the domestic and the gradual
revolutions of a state must be a more proper subject of reasoning
and observation, than the foreign and the violent, which are
commonly produced by single persons, and are more influenced by
whim, folly, or caprice, than by general passions and interests.
The depression of the lords, and rise of the commons in England,
after the statutes of alienation and the encrease of trade and
industry, are more easily accounted for by general principles,
than the depression of the Spanish, and rise of the French
monarchy, after the death of Charles V. Had Harry IV, Cardinal
Richlieu and Louis XIV been Spaniards; and Philip II, III, and
IV, and Charles II been Frenchmen, the history of these two
nations had been entirely reversed.
For the same reason, it is more easy to account for the rise
and progress of commerce in any kingdom, than for that of
learning; and a state, which should apply itself to the
encouragement of the one, would be more assured of success, than
one which should cultivate the other. Avarice, or the desire of
gain, is an universal passion, which operates at all times, in
all places, and upon all persons: But curiosity, or the love of
knowledge, has a very limited influence, and requires youth,
leisure, education, genius, and example, to make it govern any
person. You will never want booksellers, while there are buyers
of books: But there may frequently be readers where there are no
authors. Multitudes of people, necessity and liberty, have
begotten commerce in Holland: But study and application have
scarcely produced any eminent writers.
We may, therefore, conclude, that there is no subject, in
which we must proceed with more caution, than in tracing the
history of the arts and sciences; lest we assign causes which
never existed, and reduce what is merely contingent to stable and
universal principles. Those who cultivate the sciences in any
state, are always few in number: The passion, which governs them,
limited: Their taste and judgment delicate and easily perverted:
And their application disturbed with the smallest accident.
Chance, therefore, or secret and unknown causes, must have a
great influence on the rise and progress of all the refined arts.
But there is a reason, which induces me not to ascribe the
matter altogether to chance. Though the persons, who cultivate
the sciences with such astonishing success, as to attract the
admiration of posterity, be always few, in all nations and all
ages; it is impossible but a share of the same spirit and genius
must be antecedently diffused throughout the people among whom
they arise, in order to produce, form, and cultivate, from their
earliest infancy, the taste and judgment of those eminent
writers. The mass cannot be altogether insipid, from which such
refined spirits are extracted. 'There is a God within us,' says
OVID, 'who breathes that divine fire, by which we are
animated.'[2] Poets, in all ages, have advanced this claim to
inspiration. There is not, however, any thing supernatural in the
case. Their fire is not kindled from heaven. It only runs along
the earth; is caught from one breast to another; and burns
brightest, where the materials are best prepared, and most
happily disposed. The question, therefore, concerning the rise
and progress of the arts and sciences, is not altogether a
question concerning the taste, genius, and spirit of a few, but
concerning those of a whole people; and may, therefore, be
accounted for, in some measure, by general causes and principles.
I grant, that a man, who should enquire, why such a particular
poet, as Homer for instance, existed, at such a place, in such a
time, would throw himself headlong into chimaera, and could never
treat of such a subject, without a multitude of false subtilties
and refinements. He might as well pretend to give a reason, why
such particular generals, as Fabius and Scipio, lived in Rome at
such a time, and why Fabius came into the world before Scipio.
For such incidents as these, no other reason can be given than
that of Horace:
Scit genius, natale comes, qui temperat astrum,
Naturae Deus humanae, mortalis in unum...
...Quodque caput, vultu mutabilis, albus et ater.
But I am persuaded, that in many cases good reasons might be
given, why such a nation is more polite and learned at a
particular time, than any of its neighbours. At least, this is so
curious a subject, that it were a pity to abandon it entirely,
before we have found whether it be susceptible of reasoning, and
can be reduced to any general principles.
My first observation on this head is, That it is impossible
for the arts and sciences to arise, at first, among any people
unless that people enjoy the blessing of a free government.
In the first ages of the world, when men are as yet
barbarous and ignorant, they seek no farther security against
mutual violence and injustice, than the choice of some rulers,
few or many, in whom they place an implicit confidence, without
providing any security, by laws or political institutions,
against the violence and injustice of these rulers. If the
authority be centered in a single person, and if the people,
either by conquest, or by the ordinary course of propagation,
encrease to a great multitude, the monarch, finding it
impossible, in his own person, to execute every office of
sovereignty, in every place, must delegate his authority to
inferior magistrates, who preserve peace and order in their
respective districts. As experience and education have not yet
refined the judgments of men to any considerable degree, the
prince, who is himself unrestrained, never dreams of restraining
his ministers, but delegates his full authority to every one,
whom he sets over any portion of the people. All general laws are
attended with inconveniencies, when applied to particular cases;
and it requires great penetration ...
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Go to the beginning of the document
Go to previous page
Go to next page
Go to the end of document
