David Hume
A Treatise of Human Nature: Being An Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects
Book One: Of the Understanding
Book Two: Of the Passions
Book Three: Of Morals
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A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE
BOOK 1: OF THE UNDERSTANDING.
A
TREATISE
OF
Human Nature:
BEING
An ATTEMPT to introduce the experimental
Method of Reasoning
INTO
MORAL SUBJECTS.
Rara temporum felicitas, ubi sentire, quae belis; & quae
sentias, decere licet.
TACIT.
VOL. 1.
OF THE
UNDERSTANDING.
ADVERTISEMENT.
My design in the present work is sufficiently explain'd in the Introduction. The
reader must only observe, that all the subjects I have there plann'd out to
myself, are not treated of in these two volumes. The subjects of the
Understanding and Passions make a compleat chain of reasoning by themselves; and
I was willing to take advantage of this natural division, in order to try the
taste of the public. If I have the good fortune to meet with success, I shall
proceed to the examination of Morals, Politics, and Criticism; which will
compleat this Treatise of Human Nature. The approbation of the public I consider
as the greatest reward of my labours; but am determin'd to regard its judgment,
whatever it be, as my best instruction.
INTRODUCTION.
Nothing is more usual and more natural for those, who pretend to discover
anything new to the world in philosophy and the sciences, than to insinuate the
praises of their own systems, by decrying all those, which have been advanced
before them. And indeed were they content with lamenting that ignorance, which
we still lie under in the most important questions, that can come before the
tribunal of human reason, there are few, who have an acquaintance with the
sciences, that would not readily agree with them. 'Tis easy for one of judgment
and learning, to perceive the weak foundation even of those systems, which have
obtained the greatest credit, and have carried their pretensions highest to
accurate and profound reasoning. Principles taken upon trust, consequences
lamely deduced from them, want of coherence in the parts, and of evidence in the
whole, these are every where to be met with in the systems of the most eminent
philosophers, and seem to have drawn disgrace upon philosophy itself.
Nor is there requir'd such profound knowledge to discover the present imperfect
condition of the sciences, but even the rabble without doors may, judge from the
noise and clamour, which they hear, that all goes not well within. There is
nothing which is not the subject of debate, and in which men of learning are not
of contrary opinions. The most trivial question escapes not our controversy, and
in the most momentous we are not able to give any certain decision. Disputes are
multiplied, as if every thing was uncertain; and these disputes are managed with
the greatest warmth, as if every thing was certain. Amidst all this bustle 'tis
not. reason, which carries the prize, but eloquence; and no man needs ever
despair of gaining proselytes to the most extravagant hypothesis, who has art
enough to represent it in any favourable colours. The victory is not gained by
the men at arms, who manage the pike and the sword; but by the trumpeters,
drummers, and musicians of the army.
From hence in my opinion arises that common prejudice against metaphysical
reasonings of all kinds, even amongst those, who profess themselves scholars,
and have a just value for every other part of literature. By metaphysical
reasonings, they do not understand those on any particular branch of science,
but every kind of argument, which is any way abstruse, and requires some
attention to be comprehended. We have so often lost our labour in such
researches, that we commonly reject them without hesitation, and resolve, if we
must for ever be a prey to errors and delusions, that they shall at least be
natural and entertaining. And indeed nothing but the most determined scepticism,
along with a great degree of indolence, can justify this aversion to
metaphysics. For if truth be at all within the reach of human capacity, 'tis
certain it must lie very deep and abstruse: and to hope we shall arrive at it
without pains, while the greatest geniuses have failed with the utmost pains,
must certainly be esteemed sufficiently vain and presumptuous. I pretend to no
such advantage in the philosophy I am going to unfold, and would esteem it a
strong presumption against it, were it so very easy and obvious.
'Tis evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human
nature: and that however wide any of them may seem to run from it, they still
return back by one passage or another. Even. Mathematics, Natural Philosophy,
and Natural Religion, are in some measure dependent on the science of MAN; since
the lie under the cognizance of men, and are judged of by their powers and
faculties. 'Tis impossible to tell what changes and improvements we might make
in these sciences were we thoroughly acquainted with the extent and force of
human understanding, and cou'd explain the nature of the ideas we employ, and of
the operations we perform in our reasonings. And these improvements are the more
to be hoped for in natural religion, as it is not content with instructing us in
the nature of superior powers, but carries its views farther, to their
disposition towards us, and our duties towards them; and consequently we
ourselves are not only the beings, that reason, but also one of the objects,
concerning which we reason.
If therefore the sciences of Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural
Religion, have such a dependence on the knowledge of man, what may be expected
in the other sciences, whose connexion with human nature is more close and
intimate? The sole end of logic is to explain the principles and operations of
our reasoning faculty, and the nature of our ideas: morals and criticism regard
our tastes and sentiments: and politics consider men as united in society, and
dependent on each other. In these four sciences of Logic, Morals, Criticism, and
Politics, is comprehended almost everything, which it can any way import us to
be acquainted with, or which can tend either to the improvement or ornament of
the human mind.
Here then is the only expedient, from which we can hope for success in our
philosophical researches, to leave the tedious lingering method, which we have
hitherto followed, and instead of taking now and then a castle or village on the
frontier, to march up directly to the capital or center of these sciences, to
human nature itself; which being once masters of, we may every where else hope
for an easy victory. From this station we may extend our conquests over all
those sciences, which more intimately concern human life, and may afterwards
proceed at leisure to discover more fully those, which are the objects of pore
curiosity. There is no question of importance, whose decision is not compriz'd
in the science of man; and there is none, which can be decided with any
certainty, before we become acquainted with that science. In pretending,
therefore, to explain the principles of human nature, we in effect propose a
compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and
the only one upon which they can stand with any security.
And as the science of man is the-only solid foundation for the other sciences,
so the only solid foundation we can (live to this science itself must be laid on
experience and observation. 'Tis no astonishing reflection to consider, that the
application of experimental philosophy to moral subjects should come after that
to natural at the distance of above a whole century; since we find in fact, that
there was about the same interval betwixt the origins of these sciences; and
that reckoning from THALES to SOCRATES, the space of time is nearly equal to
that betwixt, my Lord Bacon and some late philosophers in England, who have
begun to put the science of man on a new footing, and have engaged the
attention, and excited the curiosity of the public. So true it is, that however
other nations may rival us in poetry, and excel us in some other agreeable arts,
the improvements in reason and philosophy can only be owing to a land of
toleration and of liberty.
Nor ought we to think, that this latter improvement in the science of man will
do less honour to our native country than the former in natural philosophy, but
ought rather to esteem it a greater glory, upon account of the greater
importance of that science, as well as the necessity it lay under of such a
reformation. For to me it seems evident, that the essence of the mind being
equally unknown to us with that of external bodies, it must be equally
impossible to form any notion of its powers ...
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