Benedict de Spinoza
POLITICAL TREATISE
WHEREIN IS DEMONSTRATED, HOW THE SOCIETY IN WHICH MONARCHICAL DOMINION FINDS PLACE, AS ALSO THAT IN WHICH THE DOMINION IS ARISTOCRATIC, SHOULD BE ORDERED, SO AS NOT TO LAPSE INTO A TYRANNY, BUT TO PRESERVE INVIOLATE THE PEACE AND FREEDOM OF THE CITIZENS.
[TRACTATUS POLITICUS.]
Edited with an Introduction
by R. H. M. Elwes
Translated by A. H. Gosset
Published by G. Bell & Son
London
1883
----------------------FROM THE EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE POSTHUMOUS WORKS OF BENEDICT DE SPINOZA.
OUR author composed the Political Treatise shortly before his death [in
1677]. Its reasonings are exact, its style clear. Abandoning the
opinions of many political writers, he most firmly propounds therein his
own judgment; and throughout draws his conclusions from his premisses.
In the first five chapters, he treats of political science in general -in the sixth and seventh, of monarchy; in the eighth, ninth, and tenth,
of aristocracy; lastly, the eleventh begins the subject of democratic
government. But his untimely death was the reason that he did not finish
this treatise, and that he did not deal with the subject of laws, nor
with the various questions about politics, as may be seen from the
following "Letter of the Author to a Friend, which may properly be
prefixed to this Political Treatise, and serve it for a Preface:" "Dear Friend, -- Your welcome letter was delivered to me yesterday. I
heartily thank you for the kind interest you take in me. I would not
miss this opportunity, were I not engaged in something, which I think
more useful, and which, I believe, will please you more -- that is, in
preparing a Political Treatise, which I began some time since, upon your
advice. Of this treatise, six chapters are already finished. The first
contains a kind of introduction to the actual work; the second treats of
natural right; the third, of the right of supreme authorities. In the
fourth, I inquire, what political matters are subject to the direction
of supreme authorities; in the fifth, what is the ultimate and highest
end which a society can contemplate; and, in the sixth, how a monarchy
should be ordered, so as not to lapse into a tyranny. I am at present
writing the seventh chapter, wherein I make a regular demonstration of
all the heads of my preceding sixth chapter, concerning the ordering of
a well-regulated monarchy. I shall afterwards pass to the subjects of
aristocratic and popular dominion, and, lastly, to that of laws and
other particular questions about politics. And so, farewell."
The author's aim appears clearly from this letter; but being hindered by
illness, and snatched away by death, he was unable, as the reader will
find for himself, to continue this work further than to the end of the
subject of aristocracy.
----------------------A POLITICAL TREATISE.
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION.
PHILOSOPHERS conceive of the passions which harass us as vices into
which men fall by their own fault, and, therefore, generally deride,
bewail, or blame them, or execrate them, if they wish to seem unusually
pious. And so they think they are doing something wonderful, and
reaching the pinnacle of learning, when they are clever enough to bestow
manifold praise on such human nature, as is nowhere to be found, and to
make verbal attacks on that which, in fact, exists. For they conceive of
men, not as they are, but as they themselves would like them to be.
Whence it has come to pass that, instead of ethics, they have generally
written satire, and that they have never conceived a theory of politics,
which could be turned to use, but such as might be taken for a chimera,
or might have been formed in Utopia, or in that golden age of the poets
when, to be sure, there was least need of it. Accordingly, as in all
sciences, which have a useful application, so especially in that of
politics, theory is supposed to be at variance with practice; and no men
are esteemed less fit to direct public affairs than theorists or
philosophers.
2. But statesmen, on the other hand, are suspected of plotting against
mankind, rather than consulting their interests, and are esteemed more
crafty than learned. No doubt nature has taught them, that vices will
exist, while men do. And so, while they study to anticipate human
wickedness, and that by arts, which experience and long practice have
taught, and which men generally use under the guidance more of fear than
of reason, they are thought to be enemies of religion, especially by
divines, who believe that supreme authorities should handle public
affairs in accordance with the same rules of piety, as bind a private
individual. Yet there can be no doubt, that statesmen have written about
politics far more happily than philosophers. For, as they had experience
for their mistress, they taught nothing that was inconsistent with
practice.
3. And, certainly, I am fully persuaded that experience has revealed all
conceivable sorts of commonwealth, which are consistent with men's
living in unity, and likewise the means by which the multitude may be
guided or kept within fixed bounds. So that I do not believe that we can
by meditation discover in this matter anything not yet tried and
ascertained, which shall be consistent with experience or practice. For
men are so situated, that they cannot live without some general law. But
general laws and public affairs are ordained and managed by men of the
utmost acuteness, or, if you like, of great cunning or craft. And so it
is hardly credible, that we should be able to conceive of anything
serviceable to a general society, that occasion or chance has not
offered, or that men, intent upon their common affairs, and seeking
their own safety, have not seen for themselves.
4. Therefore, on applying my mind to politics, I have resolved to
demonstrate by a certain and undoubted course of argument, or to deduce
from the very condition of human nature, not what is new and unheard of,
but only such things as agree best with practice. And that I might
investigate the subject-matter of this science with the same freedom of
spirit as we generally use in mathematics, I have laboured carefully,
not to mock, lament, or execrate, but to understand human actions; and
to this end I have looked upon passions, such as love, hatred, anger,
envy, ambition, pity, and the other perturbations of the mind, not in
the light of vices of human nature, but as properties, just as pertinent
to it, as are heat, cold, storm, thunder, and the like to the nature of
the atmosphere, which phenomena, though inconvenient, are yet necessary,
and have fixed causes, by means of which we endeavour to understand
their nature, and the mind has just as much pleasure in viewing them
aright, as in knowing such things as flatter the senses.
5. For this is certain, and we have proved its truth in our Ethics, [1]
that men are of necessity liable to passions, and so constituted as to
pity those who are ill, and envy those who are well off; and to be prone
to vengeance more than to mercy: and moreover, that every individual
wishes the rest to live after his own mind, and to approve what he
approves, and reject what he rejects. And so it comes to pass, that, as
all are equally eager to be first, they fall to strife, and do their
utmost mutually to oppress one another; and he who comes out conqueror
is more proud of the harm he has done to the other, than of the good he
has done to himself. And although all are persuaded, that religion, on
the contrary, teaches every man to love his neighbour as himself, that
is to defend another's right just as much as his own, yet we showed that
this persuasion has too little power over the passions. It avails,
indeed, in the hour of death, when disease has subdued the very
passions, and man lies inert, or in temples, where men hold no traffic,
but least of all, where it is most needed, in the law-court or the
palace. We showed too, that reason can, indeed, do much to restrain and
moderate the passions, but we saw at the same time, that the road, which
reason herself points out, is very steep; [2] so that such as persuade
themselves, that the multitude or men distracted by politics can ever be
induced to live according to the bare dictate of reason, must be
dreaming of the poetic golden age, or of a stage-play.
6. A dominion then, whose well-being depends on any man's good faith,
and whose affairs cannot be properly administered, unless those who are
engaged in them will act honestly, will be very unstable. On the
contrary, to insure its permanence, its public affairs should be so
ordered, that those who administer them, whether ...
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