Benedict de Spinoza
Ethics
Demonstrated in Geometric Order
AND
DIVIDED INTO FIVE PARTS,
WHICH TREAT
I.Of God.
II.Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind.
III.Of the Origin and Nature of the Affects.
IV.Of Human Bondage, or the Power of the Affects.
V.Of the Power of the Intellect, or of Human Freedom.
Translated from the Latin by R.H.M. Elwes (1883)
PART I
CONCERNING GOD.
Definitions
Axioms
Prop. I.Substance is by nature prior to its modifications.
Prop. II.Two substances, whose attributes are different, have
nothing in common.
Prop. III.Things, which have nothing in common, cannot be one the
cause of the other.
Prop. IV.Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from the
other either by the difference of the attributes of the substance,
or by the differences of their modifications.
Prop. V.There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances
having the same nature or attribute.
Prop. VI.One substance cannot be produced by another substance.
Prop. VII.Existence belongs to the nature of substance.
Prop. VIII.Every substance is necessarily infinite.
Prop. IX.The more reality or being a thing has, the greater the
number of its attributes.
Prop. X.Each particular attribute of the one substance must be
conceived through itself.
Prop. XI.God, or substance consisting of infinite attributes, of
which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality, necessarily
exists.
Prop. XII.No attribute of substance can be conceived, from which it
would follow that substance can be divided.
Prop. XIII.Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible.
Prop. XIV.Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.
Prop. XV.Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be,
or be conceived.
Prop. XVI.From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an
infinite number of things in infinite ways--that is, all things
which fall within the sphere of infinite intellect.
Prop. XVII.God acts solely by the laws of his own nature and is not
constrained by anyone.
Prop. XVIII.God is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all
things.
Prop. XIX.God and all the attributes of God are eternal.
Prop. XX.The existence of God and his essence are one and the same.
Prop. XXI.All things, which follow from the absolute nature of any
attribute of God, must always exist and be infinite, or, in other
words, are eternal and infinite through the said attribute.
Prop. XXII.Whatever follows from any attribute of God, in so far as
it is modified by a modification, which exists necessarily and as
infinite through the said attribute, must also exist necessarily and
as infinite.
Prop. XXIII.Every mode, which exists both necessarily and as
infinite, must necessarily follow either from the absolute nature of
some attribute of God, or from an attribute modified by a
modification, which exists necessarily and as infinite.
Prop. XXIV.The essence of things produced by God does not involve
existence.
Prop. XXV.God is the efficient cause not only of the existence of
things, but also of their essence.
Prop. XXVI.A thing, which is conditioned to act in a particular
manner, has necessarily been thus conditioned by God; and that which
has not been conditioned by God cannot condition itself to act.
Prop. XXVII.A thing, which has been conditioned by God to act in a
particular way, cannot render itself unconditioned.
Prop. XXVIII.Every individual thing, or everything which is finite
and has a conditioned existence, cannot exist or be conditioned to
act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action by a cause
other than itself, which also is finite and has a conditioned
existence; and likewise this cause cannot in its turn exist or be
conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and
action by another cause, which also is finite and has a conditioned
existence, and so on to infinity.
Prop. XXIX.Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all things are
conditioned to exist and operate in a particular manner by the
necessity of the divine nature.
Prop. XXX.Intellect, in function finite, or in function infinite,
must comprehend the attributes of God and the modifications of God,
and nothing else.
Prop. XXXI.The intellect in function, whether finite or infinite, as
will, desire, love, etc., should be referred to passive nature, and
not to active nature.
Prop. XXXII.Will cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary
cause.
Prop. XXXIII.Things could not have been brought into being by God in
any manner or in any order different from that which has in fact
obtained.
Prop. XXXIV.God's power is identical with his essence.
Prop. XXXV.Whatsoever we conceive to be in the power of God,
necessarily exists.
Prop. XXXVI.There is no cause from whose nature some effect does not
follow.
Appendix
PART I
CONCERNING GOD.
DEFINITIONS.
I. By that which is self-caused, I mean that of which the
essence involves existence, or that of which the nature is only
conceivable as existent.
II. A thing is called finite after its kind, when it can be
limited by another thing of the same nature; for instance, a body is
called finite because we always conceive another greater body. So,
also, a thought is limited by another thought, but a body is not
limited by thought, nor a thought by body.
III. By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is
conceived through itself; in other words, that of which a conception
can be formed independently of any other conception.
IV. By attribute, I mean that which the intellect perceives as
constituting the essence of substance.
V. By mode, I mean the modifications ["Affectiones"] of
substance, or that which exists in, and is conceived through,
something other than itself.
VI. By God, I mean a being absolutely infinite--that is, a
substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses
eternal and infinite essentiality.
Explanation.--I say absolutely infinite, not infinite after its
kind: for, of a thing infinite only after its kind, infinite
attributes may be denied; but that which is absolutely infinite,
contains in its essence whatever expresses reality, and involves no
negation.
VII. That thing is called free, which exists solely by the
necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is determined
by itself alone. On the other hand, that thing is necessary, or
rather constrained, which is determined by something external to
itself to a fixed and definite method of existence or action.
VIII. By eternity, I mean existence itself, in so far as it is
conceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition of that
which is eternal.
Explanation.--Existence of this kind is conceived as an eternal
truth, like the essence of a thing, and, therefore, cannot be
explained by means of continuance or time, though continuance may be
conceived without a beginning or end.
AXIOMS.
I. Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in
something else.
II. That which cannot be conceived through anything else must be
conceived through itself.
III. From a given definite cause an effect necessarily follows;
and, on the other hand, if no definite cause be granted, it is
impossible that an effect can follow.
IV. The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the
knowledge of a cause.
V. Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the
one by means of the other; the conception of one does not involve
the conception of the other.
VI. A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object.
VII. If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essence
does not involve existence.
PROPOSITIONS.
PROP. I. Substance is by nature prior to its modifications.
Proof.--This is clear from Def. iii. and v.
PROP. II. Two substances whose attributes are different have nothing
in common.
Proof.--Also evident from Def. iii. For each must exist in itself,
and be conceived through itself; in other words, the conception of
one does not imply the conception of the other.
PROP. III. Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the
cause of the other.
Proof.--If they have nothing in common, it follows that one cannot
be apprehended by means of the other (Ax. v.), and, therefore, one
cannot be the cause of the other (Ax. iv.). Q.E.D.
PROP. IV. Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from the
other either by the difference of the attributes of the substances,
or by the difference of their modifications.
Proof.--Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in
something else (Ax. i.),--that is (by Def. iii. and v.), nothing is
granted in addition to the understanding, except substance and its
modifications. Nothing is, therefore, given besides the
understanding, by which several things may be distinguished one from
the other, except the substances, or, in other words (see Ax. iv.),
their attributes and modifications. Q.E.D.
PROP. V. There ...
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