Anonymous
EARLY COMMENTARIES ON HUME'S WRITINGS
"An Examination of Hume's Essay on Justice"
from
European Magazine and London Review
1793
Editor's note: This anonymously written essay attacks Hume's claim
that justice is an artificially instilled virtue. The author begins
distinguishing between optional virtues, such as charity, and
obligatory ones, especially justice which is necessary for the
existence of society. For Hume, justice is artificial, deriving not
from "the constitution of human nature" but "from the association of
mankind together." Contrary to Hume, the author argues that justice
is natural. Justice lies between favor and injury. "A favour
naturally produces gratitude. An injury, if done to ourselves,
produces resentment...." Justice involves the idea of things which
are due or not due, and such ideas are no less natural than
gratitude. Gratitude and resentment, which correspond to favor and
injury, "are acknowledged by Mr. HUME himself to be natural...,"
hence justice too must be natural.
* * * *
"An Examination of Hume's Essay on Justice"
European Magazine and London Review
1793, Vol. 24, pp. 422-424
THE general distinction between Virtue and Vice is sufficiently
known to all men. There are certain actions which are universally
the objects of approbation, which we call good, virtuous, or praiseworthy. There are other actions which are universally the objects of
disapprobation, which we call bad or vicious; and which seem in many
cases to deserve punishment. The consideration of Virtue and vice,
and the questions relating to them, make up what is called the
science of Ethics or Morals.
When we consider the general distinction between virtue and
Vice; when we consider certain virtues on the one hand, and certain
vices on the other, they evidently appear to admit of a subdivision.
There are many virtues which are altogether left to our own choice - where we are at liberty to practise them or not as we please. A
man is apprehended to act improperly when he is a miser; on the
contrary, he is approved of when he acts generously: but it is never
apprehended that we can with propriety force him to act in the one
way or in the other. We do not think that we can force a miser to be
generous. {434}
On the other hand, there are certain virtues which are the
proper objects of compulsion; or certain vices which may with
propriety be restrained. It is a virtuous action for men to pay
their just debts; but if they refuse to pay them, force may be used
in order to extort the observance of this virtue, or to avoid the
contrary vice, which is precisely the same thing in another point of
view. Here then are two different classes of virtues, where the
agent is at liberty to practise them or not; and where, in other
cases, he may be compelled to observe them. This makes the
distinction between Justice and the other Virtues. These rules of
conduct, which a person may be forced to observe, belong, properly
speaking, to Justice, and make the object of Law. Those rules of
action where no force is used, make properly the subject of Ethics.
Hence it is evident that Justice is a species of Virtue. Virtue in
general comprehends Justice as well as many other particular
virtues; but all the other virtues are in a different situation from
justice in this respect -- that we may practise them or not as we
please.
Justice implies that we invade no man's property, nor violate
his rights; that we do not injure him in his person, in his family,
or in his good name: that we pay our just debts; that we make
reparation to the best of our power for any damage we have done, or
offence we may have given to others; that we fulfil our contracts,
and be faithful to our promises; that we use no fraudulent dealings,
nor take advantage of the weakness, ignorance, or necessity of those
with whom we deal; and, in a word, that we be fair, honest, and
without guile in our speech and behaviour. These, and matters of a
like nature, constitute what we call fair-dealing, honesty,
integrity. Justice is opposed both to violence and to deceit. So
necessary is Justice to the very being of human society, that
without it there could be no society at all. And it has been very
justly observed, even by the most ancient authors, that those gangs
of thieves and robbers who pay no regard to the rights of other men,
must observe the rules of Justice towards one another, otherwise
they could not possibly keep together. It would be more safe, as
well as more comfortable, for a man to renounce all human society,
and to live as an hermit in the wilderness, or to dwell with the
beasts of the field, than with men who paid no regard to justice. It
is chiefly with a view to defend themselves from injury, that men
associate together and form human societies. The first end of all
Governments, and the chief object of all human Laws, is to secure
men from unjust violations of their rights by violence or fraud, and
to deter men by punishments from all such violations of the rights
of others.
Having said these things, I shall take notice of an opinion
which HUME has advanced, and endeavoured with all his eloquence
and reasoning to support, that Justice is not a natural but an
artificial virtue. It is not a virtue which the constitution of
human nature points out to us of itself, but which, from the
association of mankind together, appears to be necessary for human
society, and is regulated entirely by its use. Nothing therefore,
according to him, is just or unjust by nature; but what is for the
benefit of society is on this account called just, and what has the
contrary tendency is called unjust.
In order to throw some light on this subject, it may be proper
first to explain, as distinctly as possible, the notion we annex to
this word JUSTICE, and then consider Mr. Hume's reasoning to shew
that it is not a natural virtue. As men, we are endowed by nature
with powers, in the exercise of which we may do good or evil to our
fellow men. When we employ our powers to promote the good and
happiness of others, this is beneficence or favour. When we exert
our powers to hurt them, this is injury. Justice lies in the middle
between these two. It is such a conduct as does no hurt to others,
though at the same time it does them no favour. Now the idea of a
favour on the one hand, and of an injury on the other, are so
universal, that it may justly be doubted, whether ever there was a
man come to years of understanding who never had in his mind the
notion of a favour and of an injury -- of a good office and of a bad
one. These notions discover themselves in all men, not by language
only, but by certain affections of mind of which they are the
natural objects. A favour naturally produces gratitude. An injury,
if done to ourselves, produces resentment; and when done to others
excites indignation. Now it is acknowledged by all, and I apprehend
by Mr. HUME himself, that gratitude and resentment are natural
ingredients {424} the human mind, no less than the appetites of
hunger and thirst; and these passions are as naturally excited by
their proper objects as these appetites. This indeed is so evident
in itself, that it would be impertinent to offer an argument for it,
as no philosopher, as far as I know, ever denied it. It is evident
that the proper object of gratitude is one who has done us a favour,
and the proper object of resentment is a person who has done us an
injury. Every sentiment of gratitude implies in its nature a
conception and belief of a favour done by the person who is the
object of our gratitude; and every sentiment of resentment implies
in its nature a belief of an injury done by the person who is the
object of our resentment. What is it then which we call a favour,
and which by the very constitution of human nature excites the
natural sentiment of gratitude? No man who is capable of reflecting
on the operations of his own mind, can be at any loss to answer this
question. An action which produces pleasure or advantage to me, is
not a favour unless that advantage or pleasure was intended. We are
told of a Physician who gave a medicine to his patient with an
intention to poison him; that the medicine, however, contrary to the
intention of the Physician, cured the disease. There was surely no
gratitude due by the patient when he knew the real state of the
case. It is evident to ...
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