Mao Tse-tung
On Guerrilla Warfare
Written: 1937
Source: Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung: Vol. IX
Written by Mao in 1937, when Japanese imperialists occupied all of China, this
book served as an instruction manual for guerrilla fighting, written based on
more than a decade of personal experience by Mao. Based on the basic strategy
and tactics of warfare as described by Sun-tzu, Mao stresses the importance of
guerrilla warfare tactics in a revolutionary war, emphasizing that they must be
combined in conjunction with conventional warfare tactics.
Contents:
What Is Guerrilla Warfare?
The Relation Of Guerrilla Hostilities to Regular Operations
Guerrilla Warfare In History
Can Victory Be Attained By Guerrilla Operations?
Organization For Guerilla Warfare
The Political Problems Of Guerrilla Warfare
The Strategy Of Guerrilla Resistance Against Japan
Appendix
1. What Is Guerrilla Warfare?
In a war of revolutionary character, guerrilla operations are a necessary part.
This is particularly true in war waged for the emancipation of a people who
inhabit a vast nation. China is such a nation, a nation whose techniques are
undeveloped and whose communications are poor. She finds herself confronted with
a strong and victorious Japanese imperialism. Under these circumstances, the
development of the type of guerrilla warfare characterized by the quality of
mass is both necessary and natural. This warfare must be developed to an
unprecedented degree and it must co-ordinate with the operations of our regular
armies. If we fail to do this, we will find it difficult to defeat the enemy.
These guerrilla operations must not be considered as an independent form of
warfare. They are but one step in the total war, one aspect of the revolutionary
struggle. They are the inevitable result of the clash between oppressor and
oppressed when the latter reach the limits of their endurance. In our case,
these hostilities began at a time when the people were unable to endure any more
from the Japanese imperialists. Lenin, in People and Revolution,[A] said: 'A
people's insurrection and a people's revolution are not only natural but
inevitable.' We consider guerrilla operations as but one aspect of our total or
mass war because they, lacking the quality of independence, are of themselves
incapable of providing a solution to the struggle.
Guerrilla warfare has qualities and objectives peculiar to itself. It is a
weapon that a nation inferior in arms and military equipment may employ against
a more powerful aggressor nation. When the invader pierces deep into the heart
of the weaker country and occupies her territory in a cruel and oppressive
manner, there is no doubt that conditions of terrain, climate, and society in
general offer obstacles to his progress and may be used to advantage by those
who oppose him. In guerrilla warfare we turn these advantages to the purpose of
resisting and defeating the enemy.
During the progress of hostilities, guerrillas gradually develop into orthodox
forces that operate in conjunction with other units of the regular army. Thus
the regularly organized troops, those guerrillas who have attained that status,
and those who have not reached that level of development combine to form the
military power of a national revolutionary war. There can be no doubt that the
ultimate result of this will be victory.
Both in its development and in its method of application, guerrilla warfare has
certain distinctive characteristics. We first will discuss the relationship of
guerrilla warfare to national policy. Because ours is the resistance of a semi
colonial country against an imperialism, our hostilities must have a clearly
defined political goal and firmly established political responsibilities. Our
basic policy is the creation of a national united anti-Japanese front. This
policy we pursue in order to gain our political goal, which is the complete
emancipation of the Chinese people. There are certain fundamental steps
necessary in the realization of this policy, to wit:
1. Arousing and organizing the people.
2. Achieving internal unification politically.
3. Establishing bases.
4. Equipping forces.
5. Recovering national strength.
6. Destroying enemy's national strength.
7. Regaining lost territories.
There is no reason to consider guerrilla warfare separately from national
policy. On the contrary, it must be organized and conducted in complete accord
with national anti-Japanese policy. It is only who misinterpret guerrilla action
who say, as does Jen Ch'i Shan, "The question of guerrilla hostilities is purely
a military matter and not a political one." Those who maintain this simple point
of view have lost sight of the political goal and the political effects of
guerrilla action. Such a simple point of view will cause the people to lose
confidence and will result in our defeat.
What is the relationship of guerrilla warfare to the people? Without a political
goal, guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must, if its political objectives do
not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy,
co-operation, and assistance cannot be gained. The essence of guerrilla warfare
is thus revolutionary in character. On the other hand, in a war of
counter-revolutionary nature, there is no place for guerrilla hostilities.
Because guerrilla warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported by
them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their
sympathies and co-operation. There are those who do not comprehend guerrilla
action, and who therefore do not understand the distinguishing qualities of a
people's guerrilla war, who say: 'Only regular troops can carry on guerrilla
operations.' There are others who, because they do not believe in the ultimate
success of guerilla action, mistakenly say: 'Guerrilla warfare is an
insignificant and highly specialized type of operation in which there is no
place for the masses of the people' (Jen Ch'i Shan). Then there are those who
ridicule the masses and undermine resistance by wildly asserting that the people
have no understanding of the war of resistance (Yeh Ch'ing, for one). The moment
that this war of resistance dissociates itself from the masses of the people is
the precise moment that it dissociates itself from hope of ultimate victory over
the Japanese.
What is the organization for guerrilla warfare? Though all guerrilla bands that
spring from the masses of the people suffer from lack of organization at the
time of their formation, they all have in common a basic quality that makes
organization possible. All guerrilla units must have political and military
leadership. This is true regardless of the source or size of such units. Such
units may originate locally, in the masses of the people; they may be formed
from an admixture of regular troops with groups of the people, or they may
consist of regular army units intact. And mere quantity does not affect this
matter. Such units may consist of a squad of a few men, a battalion of several
hundred men, or a regiment of several thousand men.
All these must have leaders who are unyielding in their policies-resolute,
loyal, sincere, and robust. These men must be well-educated in revolutionary
technique, self confident, able to establish severe discipline, and able to cope
with counter-propaganda. In short, these leaders must be models for the people.
As the war progresses, such leaders lack of discipline which at first will
gradually overcome the lack of discipline which at first prevails; they will
establish discipline in their forces, strengthening them and increasing their
combat efficiency. Thus eventual victory will be attained.
Unorganized guerrilla warfare cannot contribute to victory and those who attack
the movement as a combination of banditry and anarchism do not understand the
nature of guerrilla action. They say, 'This movement is a haven for disappointed
militarists, vagabonds, and bandits' (Jen Ch'i Shan), hoping thus to bring the
movement into disrepute. We do not deny that there are corrupt guerrillas, nor
that there are people who under the guise of guerrillas indulge in unlawful
activities. Neither do we deny that the movement has at the present time
symptoms of a lack of organization, symptoms that might indeed be serious were
we to judge guerrilla warfare solely by the corrupt and temporary phenomena we
have mentioned. We should study the corrupt phenomena and attempt to eradicate
them in order to encourage guerilla warfare, and to increase its military
efficiency. 'This is hard work, there is no help for it, and the problem cannot
be solved immediately. The whole people must try to reform themselves during the
course of the war. We must educate them and reform them in the light of past
experience. Evil does not exist in guerrilla warfare but only in the unorganized
and undisciplined activities that are anarchism,' said Lenin, in On Guerrilla
Warfare.[B]
What is basic guerrilla strategy? Guerrilla strategy must be based primarily on
alertness, mobility, and attack. It must be adjusted to the enemy situation, the
terrain, the existing lines of communication, the relative strengths, the
weather and the situation of the people.
In guerrilla warfare, select the tactic of seeming to come from ...
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