MAO TSE-TUNG
(December 27, 1935)
ON TACTICS AGAINST JAPANESE IMPERIALISM
(Report to conference of Party activists Wayaopao, northern Shensi)
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION
Comrades! A great change has now taken place in the political situation. Our
Party has defined its tasks in the light of this changed situation.
What is the present situation?
Its main characteristic is that Japanese imperialism wants to turn China
into a colony.
As we all know, for nearly a hundred years China has been a semi-colonial
country jointly dominated by several imperialist powers. Owing to the
Chinese people's struggle against imperialism and to conflicts among the
imperialist powers, China has been able to retain a semi-independent status.
For a time World War I gave Japanese imperialism the opportunity of
dominating China exclusively. But the treaty surrendering China to Japan,
the Twenty-one Demands [1] signed by Yuan Shih-kai, [2] the arch-traitor of
that time, was inevitably rendered null and void as a result of the Chinese
people's fight against Japanese imperialism and of the intervention by other
imperialist powers. In 1922 at the Washington Nine-Power Conference called
by the United States. A treaty [3] was signed which once again placed China
under the joint domination of several imperialist powers. But before long
the situation changed again. The Incident of September 18, 1931, [4] began
the present stage of Japan's colonization of China. As Japanese aggression
was temporarily limited to the four northeastern provinces, [5] some people
felt that the Japanese imperialists would probably advance no farther. Today
things are different. The Japanese imperialists have already shown their
intention of penetrating south of the Great Wall and occupying all China.
Now they want to convert the whole of China from a semi-colony shared by
several imperialist powers into a colony monopolized by Japan. The recent
Eastern Hopei Incident [6] and diplomatic talks [7] are clear indications of
this trend of events which threatens the survival of the whole Chinese
people. This faces all classes and political groups in China with the
question of what to do. Resist? Surrender? Or vacillate between the two?
Now let us see how the different classes in China answer this question.
The workers and the peasants are all demanding resistance. The revolution
of 1924-27, the agrarian revolution from 1927 to the present day, and the
anti-Japanese tide since the Incident of September 18, 1931, have all proved
that the working class and peasantry are the most resolute forces in the
Chinese revolution.
The petty bourgeoisie is also demanding resistance. Have not the student
youth and the urban petty bourgeoisie already started a broad anti-Japanese
movement? [8] This section of the Chinese petty bourgeoisie took part in the
revolution of 1924-27. Like the peasants, they are small producers in their
economic status, and their interests are irreconcilable with those of
imperialism. Imperialism and the Chinese counter-revolutionary forces have
done them great harm, driving many into unemployment, bankruptcy or
semi-bankruptcy. Now, faced with the immediate danger of becoming slaves to
a foreign nation, they have no alternative but to resist.
But how do the national bourgeoisie, the comprador and landlord classes, and
the Kuomintang face up to this question?
The big local tyrants and evil gentry, the big warlords and the big
bureaucrats and compradors have long made up their minds. They maintain, as
they have done all along, that revolution of whatever kind is worse than
imperialism. They have formed a camp of traitors, for whom the question of
whether to become slaves of a foreign nation simply does not exist because
they have already lost all sense of nationality and their interests are
inseparably linked with imperialism. Their chieftain is Chiang Kai-shek. [9]
This camp of traitors are deadly enemies of the Chinese people. Japanese
imperialism could not have become so blatant in its aggression were it not
for this pack of traitors. They are the running dogs of imperialism.
The national bourgeoisie presents a complicated problem. This class took
part in the revolution of 1924-27, but terrified by the flames of
revolution, it later deserted to the enemy of the people, the Chiang
Kai-shek clique. The question is whether there is any possibility that this
class will undergo a change in the present circumstances. We think there is.
For the national bourgeoisie is not the same as either the landlord or the
comprador class; there is a difference between them. The national
bourgeoisie is less feudal than the landlord class and not so comprador as
the comprador class. The section having more ties with foreign capital and
the Chinese landed interests form the right-wing of the national
bourgeoisie; and we shall not, for the moment, consider whether it can
change or not. The problem lies with those sections which have few or no
such ties. We believe that in the new situation in which China is threatened
with being reduced to a colony these sections may change their attitude. The
change will be marked by vacillation. On the one hand they dislike
imperialism, and on the other they fear thorough revolution, and they
vacillate between the two. This explains why they took part in the
revolution of 1924-27 and why, in the end, they went over to Chiang
Kai-shek's side. In what respect does the present period differ from 1927
when Chiang Kai-shek betrayed the revolution? China was then still a
semi-colony, but now she is on the way to becoming a colony. Over the past
nine years the national bourgeoisie has deserted its ally, the working
class, and made friends with the landlord and comprador classes, but has it
gained anything? Nothing, except the bankruptcy or semi-bankruptcy of its
industrial and commercial enterprises. Hence we believe that in the present
situation the attitude of the national bourgeoisie can change. What will be
the extent of the change? The general characteristic of the national
bourgeoisie is to vacillate. But at a certain stage of the struggle, one
section (the left-wing) may join in, while another section may vacillate
towards neutrality.
Whose class interests does the 19th Route Army led by Tsai Ting-kai [10]
and others represent? Those of the national bourgeoisie, the upper petty
bourgeoisie, and the rich peasants and small landlords in the countryside.
Did not Tsai Ting-kai and his associates once fight bitterly against the Red
Army? Yes, but they subsequently concluded an anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang
alliance with the Red Army. In Kiangsi they had attacked the Red Army, but
later in Shanghai they fought the Japanese imperialists; later still, in
Fukien they came to terms with the Red Army and turned their guns against
Chiang Kai-shek. Whatever course Tsai Ting-kai and his associates may take
in the future, and despite their Fukien People's Government's adherence to
old practice in failing to arouse the people to struggle, it must be
considered beneficial to the revolution that they turned their guns,
originally trained on the Red Army, against Japanese imperialism and Chiang
Kai-shek. It marked a split within the Kuomintang camp. If the circumstances
following the September 18th Incident could cause this group to split away,
why cannot the present circumstances give rise to other splits in the
Kuomintang? Those Party members who hold that the whole landlord and
bourgeois camp is united and permanent and will not change under any
circumstances are wrong. They not only fail to appreciate the present grave
situation, they have even forgotten history.
Let me speak a little mote about the past. In 1926 and 1927, during the
time when the revolutionary army advanced on Wuhan, captured it and marched
into Honan, Tang Sheng-chih and Feng Yu-hsiang [11] took part in the
revolution. In 1933, Feng Yu-hsiang co-operated for a time with the
Communist Party in forming the Anti-Japanese Allied Army in Chahar Province.
Take another striking example. Did not the 26th Route Army, which, together
with the 19th Route Army, had attacked the Red Army in Kiangsi, stage the
Ningtu Uprising [12] in December 1931 and become part of the Red Army? The
leaders of the Ningtu Uprising, Chao Po-sheng, Tung Chen-tang and others,
have become steadfast comrades in the revolution.
The anti-Japanese operations of Ma Chan-shan [13] in the three northeastern
provinces represented another split in the ruling class camp.
All these instances indicate that splits will occur in the enemy camp when
all China comes within the range of Japanese bombs, and when the struggle
changes its normal pace and suddenly surges forward.
Now, comrades, let us turn to another aspect of the question.
Is it correct to object to our view on the ground that China's national
bourgeoisie is politically and economically flabby, and to argue that it
cannot possibly change its attitude in spite of the new circumstances? I
...
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