MAO TSE-TUNG
(October 5, 1928)
WHY IS IT THAT RED POLITICAL POWER CAN EXIST IN CHINA?
I.
THE INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION
The present regime of the new warlords of the Kuomintang remains a regime of
the comprador class in the cities and the landlord class in the countryside;
it is a regime which has capitulated to imperialism in its foreign relations
and which at home has replaced the old warlords with new ones, subjecting
the working class and the peasantry to an even more ruthless economic
exploitation and political oppression. The bourgeois-democratic revolution
which started in Kwangtung Province had gone only halfway when the comprador
and landlord classes usurped the leadership and immediately shifted it on to
the road of counter-revolution; throughout the country the workers, the
peasants, the other sections of the common people, and even the bourgeoisie,
[1] have remained under counter-revolutionary rule and obtained not the
slightest particle of political or economic emancipation.
Before their capture of Peking and Tientsin, the four cliques of the new
Kuomintang warlords, Chiang Kai-shek, the Kwangsi warlords, Feng Yu-hsiang
and Yen Hsi-shan, [2] formed a temporary alliance against Chang Tso-lin. [3]
As soon as these cities were captured, this alliance broke up, giving way to
bitter struggle among the four cliques, and now a war is brewing between the
Chiang and the Kwangsi cliques. The contradictions and struggles among the
cliques of warlords in China reflect the contradictions and struggles among
the imperialist powers. Hence, as long as China is divided among the
imperialist powers, the various cliques of warlords cannot under any
circumstances come to terms, and whatever compromises they may reach will
only be temporary. A temporary compromise today engenders a bigger war
tomorrow.
China is in urgent need of a bourgeois-democratic revolution, and this
revolution can be completed only under the leadership of the proletariat.
Because the proletariat failed to exercise firm leadership in the revolution
of 1926-27 which started from Kwangtung and spread towards the Yangtze
River, leadership was seized by the comprador and landlord classes and the
revolution was replaced by counterrevolution. The bourgeois-democratic
revolution thus met with a temporary defeat. This defeat was a heavy blow to
the Chinese proletariat and peasantry and also a blow to the Chinese
bourgeoisie (but not to the comprador and landlord classes). Yet in the last
few months, both in the north and in the south, there has been a growth of
organized strikes by the workers in the cities and of insurrections by the
peasants in the countryside under the leadership of the Communist Party.
Hunger and cold are creating great unrest among the soldiers of the warlord
armies. Meanwhile, urged on by the clique headed by Wang Ching-wei and Chen
Kung-po, the bourgeoisie is promoting a reform movement of considerable
proportions [4] in the coastal areas and along the Yangtze River. This is a
new development.
According to the directives of the Communist International and the Central
Committee of our Party, the content of China's democratic revolution
consists in overthrowing the rule of imperialism and its warlord tools in
China so as to complete the national revolution, and in carrying out the
agrarian revolution so as to eliminate the feudal exploitation of the
peasants by the landlord class. Such a revolutionary movement has been
growing day by day since the Tsinan Massacres in May 1928. [5]
II.
REASONS FOR THE EMERGENCE AND SURVIVAL OF RED POLITICAL POWER IN CHINA
[6]
The long-term survival inside a country of one or more small areas under
Red political power completely encircled by a White regime is a phenomenon
that has never occurred anywhere else in the world. There are special
reasons for this unusual phenomenon. It can exist and develop only under
certain conditions.
First, it cannot occur in any imperialist country or in any colony under
direct imperialist rule [7] but can only occur in China which is
economically backward, and which is semi-colonial and under indirect
imperialist rule. For this unusual phenomenon can occur only in conjunction
with another unusual phenomenon, namely, war within the White regime. It is
a feature of semicolonial China that, since the first year of the Republic
[1912] the various cliques of old and new warlords have waged incessant wars
against one another, supported by imperialism from abroad and by the
comprador and landlord classes at home. Such a phenomenon is to be found in
none of the imperialist countries nor for that matter in any colony under
direct imperialist rule, but only in a country like China which is under
indirect imperialist rule. Two things account for its occurrence, namely, a
localized agricultural economy (not a unified capitalist economy) and the
imperialist policy of marking off spheres of influence in order to divide
and exploit. The prolonged splits and wars within the White regime provide a
condition for the emergence and persistence of one or more small Red areas
under the leadership of the Communist Party amidst the encirclement of the
White regime. The independent regime carved out on the borders of Hunan and
Kiangsi Provinces is one of many such small areas. In difficult or critical
times some comrades often have doubts about the survival of Red political
power and become pessimistic The reason is that they have not found the
correct explanation for its emergence and survival. If only we realize that
splits and wars will never cease within the White regime in China, we shall
have no doubts about the emergence, survival and daily growth of Red
political power.
Second, the regions where China's Red political power has first emerged and
is able to last for a long time have not been those unaffected by the
democratic revolution, such as Szechuan, Kweichow, Yunnan and the northern
provinces, but regions such as the provinces of Hunan, Kwangtung, Hupoh and
Kiangsi, where the masses of workers, peasants and soldiers rose in great
numbers in the course of the bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1926 and
1927. In many parts of these provinces trade unions and peasant associations
were formed on a wide scale, and many economic and political struggles were
waged by the working class and the peasantry against the landlord class and
the bourgeoisie. This is why the people held political power for three days
in the city of Canton and why independent regimes of peasants emerged in
Haifeng and Lufeng, in eastern and southern Hunan, in the Hunan-Kiangsi
border area and in Huangan, Hupeh Province. [8] As for the present Red Army,
it is a split-off from the National Revolutionary Army which underwent
democratic political training and came under the influence of the masses of
workers and peasants. The elements that make up the Red Army cannot possibly
come from armies like those of Yen Hsi-shan and Chang Tso-lin, which have
not received any democratic political training or come under the influence
of the workers and peasants.
Third, whether it is possible for the people's political power in small
areas to last depends on whether the nation-wide revolutionary situation
continues to develop. If it does, then the small Red areas will undoubtedly
last for a long time, and will, moreover, inevitably become one of the many
forces for winning nation-wide political power. If the nation-wide
revolutionary situation does not continue to develop but stagnates for a
fairly long time, then it will be impossible for the small Red areas to last
long. Actually, the revolutionary situation in China is continuing to
develop with the continuous splits and wars within the ranks of the
comprador and landlord classes and of the international bourgeoisie.
Therefore the small Red areas will undoubtedly last for a long time, and
will also continue to expand and gradually approach the goal of seizing
political power throughout the country.
Fourth, the existence of a regular Red Army of adequate strength is a
necessary condition for the existence of Red political power. If we have
local Red Guards [9] only but no regular Red Army, then we cannot cope with
the regular White forces, but only with the landlords' levies. Therefore,
even when the masses of workers and peasants are active, it is definitely
impossible to create an independent regime, let alone an independent regime
which is durable and grows daily, unless we have regular forces of adequate
strength. It follows that the idea of "establishing independent regimes of
the workers and the peasants by armed force" is an important one which must
be fully grasped by the Communist Party and by the masses of workers and
peasants in areas under the independent regime.
Fifth another important condition in addition to the above is required for
the prolonged existence and development of Red political power, namely, that
the Communist Party organization should be strong and its policy correct.
III. THE INDEPENDENT REGIME IN THE HUNAN KIANGSI BORDER AREA AND THE AUGUST
DEFEAT
Splits ...
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