W. Bagehot
Principles of Political Economy, with some of their applications to Social
Philosophy. By J. S. Mill.
The Prospective Review, vol. IV, 16, 1848, pp.. 460-502
The work on which we are about to comment, seems to us unavoidably to present
great difficulties to a reviewer. The admirable qualities of mind displayed in
it, and the extensive research out of which it has sprung, make it necessary for
the critic to practise a humility, to which he is perchance but little
accustomed. Moreover the great size of the work, the number of valuable
discussions which it contains, and, more than all, the great importance of
almost the whole of its subject-matter, exact from us a difficult selection of
topics, in order that our article may not be unpleasing to our readers or
altogether unworthy of the work under review.
The course which we shall take will be first to mark Mr. Mill's position among
economical and, so far as a few words will go, among general thinkers: and,
after this introduction to select a single large class of considerations, viz.,
those bearing on the condition of the labouring classes: and to devote our
attention to these exclusively. We choose this branch of the subject, not only
because of its own intrinsic interest, but also because it contains a large
proportion of Mr. Mill's peculiar and characteristic ideas. He is the first
among great English Economists who has ventured to maintain, that the present
division of the industrial community into labourers and capitalists is neither
destined nor adapted for a long-continued existence: that a large production of
wealth is much less important than a good distribution of it: that a state of
industry in which both capital and population are stationary is as favourable to
national well-being as one in which they are advancing: that fixed customs are
perpetually modifying the effects which unrestrained competition would of itself
inevitably produce: that a large body of peasant proprietors is usually a source
of great national advantage: and that a system of Emigration on a great scale
would be productive of much benefit to the English peasantry by raising their
habitual standard of comfort, and therefore putting a check on the reckless
increase of a miserable population. These propositions (which are not all that
might be set down) will be enough to prove that the subject we have selected for
discussion with Mr. Mill contains a sufficient number of his peculiar opinions,
and therefore asking our readers to acquiesce in our selection of a special
topic, we shall pass on to the general and introductory portion of our article.
In the preface to his work Mr. Mill states that he wishes his work to comprise
both the theoretic exposition of purely economical doctrine, and also the
extraneous considerations most necessary for its correct application to the real
world in which we have to live and act. This he says, because he habitually
bears in mind that Political Economy is founded on certain assumptions of which
it is very convenient to trace out the consequences separately, but which being
seldom accurately true, and being often very wide of the mark, will lead
logically to consequences that it may be hazardous to apply without correction
to the actual condition of mankind. Thus it is perpetually assumed that men will
always buy what they want as cheaply as they can; whereas in matter of fact,
vanity, liberality and indolence are perpetually preventing purchasers from
beating down prices to the full extent of their ability.
The existence of such exceptional considerations distributes economists into two
classes. What we may call common-sense thinkers have always seen that these
extraneous influences were very important matters for their attention wherever
actual practice was at all concerned. Adam Smith for example is the most
striking specimen of this class of thinkers. He is very eminent in making short
inductions from admitted facts, and in applying them with consistency and skill.
He is not eminent for precision of statement or for microscopic accuracy of
thought: but he is in general very successful in rather vague descriptions of
conspicuous phenomena, and in tracing them back to the most influential of their
proximate causes. It is evident that a mind so habitually starting with observed
fact would be unlikely to neglect important agencies or to bind itself by purely
hypothetical assumptions. Ricardo on the other hand is the most important of
what may be called the abstract thinkers on the philosophy of wealth. He sets
out from certain primitive assumptions, and from these he proceeds to evolve all
his results by mere deduction. He but rarely comes into contact with the actual
world at all: but frames a hypothetical one which exists nowhere out of his own
imagination. Accordingly his views of his subject must be called deep rather
than wide: explaining a little very well, but leaving much without remark:
giving a little truth which it was difficult to arrive at, rather than a
comprehensive summary of all the principles that modify the phenomena which he
is considering. In reference to these peculiarities of their minds, it is
certainly very remarkable that Adam Smith should have been a recluse student,
during his whole life almost exclusively with abstractions, and that Ricardo,
who is so eminently an abstract thinker, should have been bred up in actual
business, and should have attained his powers of deductive reasoning without any
early philosophical discipline. It would certainly have been expected, if we had
not known how little outward circumstances avail against the intrinsic aptitudes
of a strong mind, that Adam Smith would have looked on nature principally
"through the spectacles of books," and that Ricardo would have taken that
general, vague, but in the main sufficient, judgment upon matters of fact which
is generally called "common sense," and which alone among the higher
intellectual gifts is habitually exercised in every-day practical life.
In that part of his preface to which we just now alluded, Mr. Mill has
substantially expressed his intention of conciliating the two modes of dealing
with his subject; that is, of combining the abstract deduction and logical
accuracy which are exemplified in Ricardo with that largeness of view and
thorough acquaintance with diversified matters of fact for which the "Wealth of
Nations" is so eminently remarkable.
And this great undertaking he has, so far as we can judge, admirably
accomplished. The principal applications of abstract science are here treated of
with a fulness of information, an impartiality of judgment, and a command over
general principles, any one of which would have by itself been enough to make
the work take rank as one of eminent merit, and to the union of which we have
never seen anything in an economical writer, even approximating equal. No great
subject within the range of Political Economy appears to us to have been wholly
omitted, and if we acknowledge that all the larger considerations which we could
wish for, are not on all occasions introduced, we also admit that minds trained
in different schools of thought, and seeing life generally under a somewhat
different aspect, must inevitably form conflicting judgments as to what was, and
what was not, relevant to particular social problems. We are bound to add, that
in almost all cases there is evidence that Mr. Mill has given much and earnest
attention to all the kinds of argument which seemed to him capable of being
opposed to his opinions. Nor with the exception of the 'System of Logic' have we
read any contemporary publication in which the desire for the mere discovery of
truth was either so strong in itself or so immensely preponderant over every
other consideration. The false colours of prejudice and passion have no place in
an intellect so thoroughly achromatic.
We feel it, therefore, to be almost presumption in us to attempt, as we
promised, a description, even in the most general way, of Mr. Mill's position in
the list of general thinkers. Yet it seems to us incumbent on the critic of such
a man to try his hand at some such task. Mr. Mill has treated with first-rate
ability of subjects which involve a discussion of many problems which concern
most intimately the highest interests of man; and if we give a notion of the
place he appears to us to occupy among important thinkers, it will be seen why,
in some instances, we differ from him, and agree with those whom we should place
higher on the scale of worth. Mr. Mill then belongs we think to the Aristotelic
or unspiritual order of great thinkers. A Philosopher of this sort starts always
from considerations of pure intellect. He never assumes the teachings of
conscience: he never, that is, treats as primordial facts, either the existence
of a law of duty independent of consequences, nor a moral government of the
world, nor a connection either between virtue and ...
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